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Professor Waller's Un-American Approach to
Antitrust
Robert H. Lande*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Professor Waller asks an un-American question - what can the
United States antitrust program learn from the rest of the world?1 This
question is un-American because we in the United States rarely look to
others for advice. Besides, we invented antitrust2 and we were
practically alone in the world in enforcing antitrust for almost a
century. 3 Only during the current generation have many other nations
had active and vigorous antitrust programs. 4 Moreover, the United
States is in the business of exporting our accumulated century of

* Venable Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law and Director, American
Antitrust Institute. The author would like to thank Kelly Phillips and Michaela Roberts for
excellent research assistance.
\. See Spencer Weber Waller, Bringing Globalism Home: Lessons from Antitrust and Beyond,
32 LoY. U. CHI. L. J. 113 (2000).
2. Professor Waller notes that, technically, Canada enacted an antitrust law a year before the
United States did. See Waller, supra note I, at 114. But Canada's antitrust law was virtually
unenforced until the 1980s. See W.T. Stanbury, Legislation to Control Agreements in Restraint
of Trade in Canada: Review of the Historical Record and Proposals for Reform, in CANADIAN
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY AT THE CENTENARY 61-148 (R.S. Khemani & W.T. Stanbury
eds., 1991). Moreover, several individual states within the United States enacted their own
antitrust laws before the Canadian law was passed. See James May, Antitrust Practice and
Procedure in the Formative Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust
Law, 1880-1918, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 495, 498-500 (1987). Professor May demonstrates that
several extremely important state antitrust cases were filed before the Canadian antitrust law was
passed. See id. at 500-01. Thus, the Canadians cannot truly be said to have been in the antitrust
business before the United States.
3. Our first national antitrust law was passed in 1890. See 15 U.S.c. §§ 1-7 (1994)
(commonly referred to as the Sherman Act); see also 9 JULIAN O. VON KALINOWSKI ET AL.,
ANTITRUST LAWS & TRADE REGULATION § 200m, at 200-6 to 200-7 (Frank Fine ed., 2d ed.
2000). By contrast, other nations rarely possessed and enforced their own antitrust laws before
1960. See THOMAS C. VINJE ET AL., WORLD ANTITRUST LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 15.1,25.2,
26.1,28.1, 29B.I, 29C.I, 33.1, 35.1 (James J. Garrett ed. 1997 & Supp. 1999) (detailing the
beginnings of antitrust law in the European Union, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Belgium,
the Netherlands, Mexico and Japan).
4. See VINJE ET AL., supra note 3, §§ 15.1,25.2,26.1,28.1, 29B.I, 29C.1, 33.1, 35.1.
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antitrust wisdom through a wide variety of methods, and we revel in
playing this role. 5 We Americans are generally provincial and
unaccustomed to taking advice from the rest of the world in anything,
but least of all in the area of antitrust. 6 That is why Professor Waller's
suggestion that we do so is un-American.
Still, there are three reasons why Professor Waller is correct and the
United States should consider what lessons we could learn from other
nations. First, the European Community and other nations now have
had roughly a generation of real experience with antitrust. 7 Although
their economies are as developed as ours, they have different laws and
different enforcement mechanisms. 8 They have had different antitrust
experiences and have run "laboratory tests" that we have, perhaps, never
run, or have run only during a very different economic era. 9
Second, other nations have essentially re-thought every antitrust issue
from scratch. The Europeans take much less for granted and will ask
questions that we may not ask.lO By contrast, after more than a century
of antitrust, we often have an incrementalist mentality.
Third, if we are so smart, why has our antitrust policy changed so
radically within the past generation? I I Contrast Warren Court antitrust
policy with Reagan Administration antitrust policy with Clinton
Administration antitrust policy and you will see sharp, even radical,
swings in policy.12 We certainly cannot say with a straight face that,
with our century of experience, we have got antitrust policy basically
right and are now just fiddling with the fourth decimal place. 13 For all

5. Among the methods that we use to share our accumulated antitrust expertise are
conferences, courses, sending people to work with new competition agencies, sending material,
and discussing issues over the phone and bye-mail. I confess that I have joined the bandwagon
and evangelized the virtues of American antitrust at meetings and conferences in Europe, Latin
America, and Asia, and have advised visiting delegations from many nations.
6. See Waller, supra note I, at 115.
7. See VINJE ET AL., supra note 3, §§ IS.!, 25.2, 26.1, 28.1, 29B.!, 29C.1, 33.1,35.1.
8. See id.
9. There might be times, moreover, where we can learn antitrust lessons even from nations
without effective antitrust enforcement. See Robert H. Lande & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr.,
Anticonsumer Effects of Union Mergers: An Antitrust Solution, 46 DUKE L.J. 197,227-37 (1996);
Robert H. Lande & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., More Lessons From Japan: End lndustrywide
Collective Bargaining?, 4 ASIAN ECON. J. 28 (1990) (both analyzing the collective bargaining
system in Japan as a potential model for the United States).
10. See Waller, supra note I, at liS.
II. See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as the Ruler of
Antitrust, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 429, 458-63 (1988).
12. See id. at 438-44.
13. For example, there is much debate over whether the current Microsoft case represents
sound policy. Commentators in the United States are sharply divided. See, e.g., Waller, supra
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of these reasons, Professor Waller is correct and we should start to look
to foreign antitrust experiences for guidance.
The tremendous difficulty with examining the antitrust laws of other
nations is one that Professor Waller highlights. Antitrust systems have
to be made with due regard for the history, culture, politics, and
institutions of the affected nations. I4 Just as other nations must hesitate
before adopting our suggestions, so too must we hesitate before
adopting advice based upon their experiences. With this in mind I will
comment upon many of the issues that Professor Waller raised.
II. THE NEED TO CONTROL PUBLIC ECONOMIC POWER

Professor Waller observes that in the United States we have such
high regard for federalism and local authority that we have decided that
the antitrust laws were not intended to apply to the conduct of a state or
subsidiary unit unless there is some affirmative reason to believe that
this presumption is incorrect. 15 We elevate this concern so much that
we have even constitutionalized it.I6 As Professor Waller notes, we
interpret this immunity from antitrust scrutiny quite broadly. 17
Professor Waller observes that the European Union utilizes a much
narrower "state action" exemption, in most cases forbidding member
nations from taking any measure contrary to the Treaty of Rome. 18 He
also cites other nations with a similarly broad reach to their antitrust
laws and a similarly narrow "state action" exception. I9
Professor Waller convincingly cites a wide range of authority for the
proposition that governmental units often engage in significantly
anticompetitive rent-seeking behavior. 20

note I, at 118.
14. See id. at 114-15. I made this point as a routine matter when I gave lectures on lessons
that might be learned from United States antitrust experience in Peru, Venezuela and Japan. On
every occasion I was congratulated for not showing the arrogance of previous United States
speakers who evangelized United States antitrust law without due regard for local conditions.
15. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (holding that the marketing plan adopted for the
1940 raisin crop under the California Agricultural Prorate Act was not a violation of the federal
Sherman Act, the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, or the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution); Waller, supra note I, at 118-19.
16. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment prohibits Congress from authorizing suits enacted under the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act by Native American tribes against states that do not consent to be sued).
17. See Waller, supra note I, at 120.
18. See id. at 121-22.
19. See id. at 123-24.
20. See id. at 120-21.
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He also points out how the United States' unusually broad "state
action" doctrine is likely to handicap it in a variety of international trade
negotiations involving the World Trade Organization, the North
American Free Trade Agreement, etc. 21
Professor Waller, therefore, believes that we should adopt a "state
action" doctrine closer to the European approach, one that is in certain
respects the opposite from the one we currently employ.22 Professor
Waller asserts that the United States should start with a presumption
that antitrust laws apply to anticompetitive conduct unless we are
relatively sure that Congress intended to exempt it. 23 Although he is
certainly not the first commentator to call for a cutback on the United
States' very expansive "state action" doctrine,24 Professor Waller is one
of the first to use other nations' experience with a very different
approach to this issue to persuasively support the argument that the
United States' approach is unwise. 25 At a minimum, he advocates that
we affirmatively debate and decide this issue, rather than just passively
accept this judicially created doctrine. 26
There is an irony that, from an antitrust perspective, states within the
United States have more autonomy and power than do nations within
the European Union. 27 States here have more power both to immunize
allegedly anticompetitive activity, and also to challenge it. 28 I share
Professor Waller's concern about the likelihood that the United States'
current approach results in widespread anticompetitive behavior and
handicaps our negotiating position in a variety of international
contexts. 29 I accept his belief that we should change our approach, and
I also accept his proposed solution. 3o
I have questions, however, concerning how Professor Waller's
suggestion could ever be implemented. There is a maxim that it is
21. See id. at 124-25.
22. See id. at 126-27.
23. See id. at 126.
24. Nor does he claim to be. Waller cites others who have advocated this same position. See
id.
25. See id. at 114, 126-27 (discussing the work of other scholars). Waller also provides a
number of additional arguments as to why the current United States' "state action" doctrine is
unwise. See id. at 115-16.
26. See id. at 127.
27. See id. at 118-20 (discussing autonomy of U.S. states); id. at 120-22 (discussing EU
nations).
28. See id. at 118-20.
29. See id. at 118-19 (discussing anticompetitive behavior); id. at 124-25 (discussing
handicapping in international contexts).
30. See id. at 126-27.
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harder to take something away than never to get it in the first place.
Now that our states enjoy this autonomy, how can we get them to
relinquish something they regard as their right?3l
Professor Waller provides two new arguments that might move our
nation closer to his ideal. 32 The first is his argument which points out
that France, Germany and Italy gave up much more autonomy than did
the states within the United States. 33 The second is his documentation
demonstrating that not doing so will increasingly disadvantage the
United States in a variety of international areas. 34
Another possibility is to devise ways whereby our states can
temporarily give up some of their autonomy in a voluntary, non-binding
manner. After some experience, the states might be willing to
relinquish this power more formally and permanently.
The merger area could provide an example where this possibility
could work. In the United States, any state can challenge any corporate
merger. 35 If IBM, Microsoft, and AT&T attempted to merge, for
example, any state could challenge the merger even if federal enforcers
thought that the merger was benign or pro-consumer. 36 It is even
possible that such a challenge could be without merit, yet the delays and
uncertainty caused by the challenge could scuttle a transaction that the
federal enforcers believed was in the public interest. 37
By contrast, if an analogous merger happened in Europe it would be
reviewed by the European Union, but not by the individual member
states. 38 Because I believe that the issue of whether such a merger
would be good for our country should be a national one, in this respect
the European system is superior to ours. The difficulty, however, is the
31. Many state antitrust enforcers remember the vacuum created by the virtual nonenforcement of antitrust by the federal enforcers during the Reagan Administration. The state
enforcers are reluctant to give up any of their enforcement power in part because of their fear that
an era of virtual non-enforcement could return.
32. See Waller, supra note I, at 126-27.
33. See id. at 118-19,121-22.
34. See id. at 124-25.
35. The only limitation is that the challenged merger must affect commerce within that state.
This is not much of a limitation. See Robert H. Lande, When Should States Challenge Mergers:
A Proposed FederallState Balance, 35 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REv. 1047, 1049-52, 1061-62 (1990)
(discussing the balance between state and federal merger enforcement, and proposing guidelines
that would allocate merger enforcement between state and federal enforcers).
36. See id. at 1061-62 (discussing how critics oppose the relative ease with which state
attorneys general can challenge corporate mergers).
37. See id. at 1061-62, 1065.
38. The nation states in the European Union can only review a large merger under relatively
unusual circumstances. See id. at 1075 (discussing three exceptions under which individual
member nations can challenge mergers).
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political issue of how we could move our system closer to the European
model.
One way to move towards the ideal would be for federal and state
antitrust enforcers in the United States to agree upon a voluntary
division of merger authority.39 Mergers with a truly national dimension
- like the one hypothesized above - would be handled by federal
enforcers. Mergers that were relatively small or that primarily affected
a particular state could be left to the appropriate state antitrust enforcers.
Such division of authority could be modeled after the European solution
to this issue40 and could, indeed, be a productive emulation of the
European antitrust model.

III.

ANTITRUST AS REGULATION

Professor Waller correctly observes that in the United States antitrust
and economic regulation are viewed as being very different. 41 He
demonstrates that in reality, however, the two systems are not as
different as we generally believe. 42 He shows that in the United States
the notion of antitrust as a one-time, "yes or no," market intervention
has increasingly been replaced by a form of antitrust that is closer to
traditional forms of economic regulation. 43 While no one would ever
mistake the Federal Trade Commission for the Federal Communications
Commission, the Federal Trade Commission has, as Professor Waller
has shown, certainly moved in that agency's direction in recent years. 44
He also demonstrates that most other nations, by contrast, view antitrust
as a subset of the field of economic regulation, and as a form of light
regulation. 45
Why the continued, even vehement insistence by much if not most of
the United States antitrust community that antitrust is not a form of
39. See id. at 1072-91 (proposing a solution to responsibility for merger enforcement by
designating areas of federal responsibility, state responsibility and shared responsibility).
40. See id. at 1074-81 (discussing the benefits and problems associated with adopting the
European model in the United States).
41. See Waller, supra note I, at 127.
42. See id.
43. See id. Professor Waller develops this argument in more detail in Spencer Weber Waller,
Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383

(1998).

44. In one important respect the Federal Trade Commission might be about to take a step
back. Chairman Pitofsky believes that the Commission should playa smaller role in restructuring
mergers. See Robert Pitofsky, The Nature and Limits of Restructuring in Merger Review,
Remarks at the Cutting Edge Antitrust Conference (Feb. 17,2000) available at <http://www.ftc.
gov/speeches/pitofsky/restruct.htm1>.
45. See Waller, supra note I, at 128.
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regulation? I offer three possible reasons. The first is theoretical.
Antitrust has, as an essential part of its foundation, the concept of
market failure. 46 The "big picture" reason for the existence of the
antitrust laws is the belief that the market usually will work optimally,
but that sometimes a cartel or large merger will prevent it from doing
so. Under these very limited circumstances a one time or, increasingly,
a slightly more complicated intervention is necessary.47 By contrast,
traditional economic regulation starts from the opposite presumption:
there are certain industries for which market forces essentially cannot
work, so we must use regulation to mimic the workings of the free
market as best as we can.48 These differing initial theoretical
underpinnings affect how the antitrust profession views itself no matter
how carefully Professor Waller points out how much the fields have
converged over the years.
Second, antitrust started as being quite different from other forms of
regulation. Professor Waller has shown how antirust and other
regulation forms have evolved towards one another over the years. 49
Most of his examples, however, are taken from the current generation. 5o
Antitrust in 1980, and certainly in 1960, was much closer to law
enforcement than it is now. Yet, when practitioners think "what is
antitrust?" they inevitably invoke memories of antitrust's past, the
majority of which was much less regulatory than antitrust's present.
A final explanation is ideological. During the Reagan Administration
virtually all government regulation was sharply denounced. 51
"Regulation" was a dirty word, and regulators were, at best, a necessary
evil and, at worst, lazy leeches stealing from the taxpayers. 52 People in
the antitrust community tried to find protection, or "cover," by denying
that they were engaged in economic regulation. The antitrust
comrnunity53 tried to say, in effect: "we are not regulators; if anything,
46. See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of
Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 722-34 (1997).
47. See id. at 716-20.
48. See RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 377-97 (5th ed. 1998).
49. See Waller, supra note I, at 127.
50. See POSNER, supra note 48, at 377-97; Waller, supra note 43, at 1397-1400, 1401-08,

1409-17,1423-25.
51. Recall President Reagan's statement that, "government is not the solution to our problem;
government is the problem." Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1981) available at
<http://bcn.boulder.co.us!governmentlnational!speeches/inau4.htm1>.
52. Ironically, the high priority that conservatives have for business certainty and for limits on
the discretion of government officials may have helped to increase the role of formal guidelines
and other relatively regulatory devices in antitrust.
53. I was employed at the Federal Trade Commission from 1978 to 1984.
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we are deregulators; we believe in the wonders of free markets, and
only intervene on rare occasions, and then, only to help the market
work." Even today, when certain people call antitrust a form of
regulation I, perhaps incorrectly, view that as a possible attack on the
legitimacy of the entire antitrust field. 54
Suppose, however, that the United States did regard antitrust as
another light form of regulation. This view would have the advantage
of being more accurate. But could it make any other difference?
It is possible that the perception of antitrust as a form of light
regulation could make it easier for the United States to engage in
worthwhile economic deregulation. For example, when the airlines
were deregulated55 proponents of deregulation commonly pointed out
that regulation would not be eliminated entirely - it would instead be
replaced with antitrust law so that if the airlines formed a cartel or tried
to engage in anticompetitive mergers, antitrust enforcement (instead of
direct regulation) would protect consumers. 56 If antitrust were
portrayed as just another form of regulation, then the proponents of the
next target of deregulation - electricity, for example - could say that
they were not abolishing regulation, they were only replacing one form
of regulation with another. Perhaps this would be another way to sell
deregulation efforts.
Let me now combine Professor Waller's first two main ideas in a
concrete area. The United States has a very broad antitrust exemption
for our insurance industry.57 This exemption is the product of both a
statute that largely leaves insurance regulation to the states 58 and our
expansive "state action" doctrine. 59 The insurance industry argues that
54. For example, Professor Waller notes that Professor Fred McChesney, a leading
conservativellibertarian critic of antitrust enforcement, has called antitrust just another form of
regulation. See Waller, supra note 43, at 1386. When Professor McChesney lumps antitrust
together with other forms of economic regulation, he certainly is not doing so in order to
compliment the basic idea of having antitrust laws or antitrust enforcement. Other scholars that
Waller cites, however, are much more supportive of antitrust, and their use of the comparison
would not have an ideological aspect to it. See id. at 1386 n.9.
55. See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.c. §§ 40101-40120 (1994), amended by
Pub. L. No. 106-181, Title ill, § 301, Title VII, § 702(a), 114 Stat. 115, 155 (current version at 49
V.S.C.A. §§ 40101-40124 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000)).
56. See Stephen G. Breyer, Antitrust. Deregulation and the Newly Liberated Marketplace, 75
CAL. L. REV. 1005,1007-09 (1987).
57. See 9 EARL W. KINTER & JOSEPH P. BAUER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 34, 179-80
(1989).
58. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1994).
59. See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 V.S. 205,231-33 (1979)
(defining the scope of the insurance industry exemption); Jeffrey D. Schwartz, Comment, The
Use of the Antitrust State Action Doctrine in the Deregulated Electric Utility Industry, 48 AM. U.
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all kinds of calamities will befall it, the insured, and our economy if the
industry were subjected to normal antitrust scrutiny instead of the
existing system of state-by-state regulation. 60
Scholars might do well to follow Professor Waller's lead and find
developed economies where the insurance industry is subject, not to
regulation, but to an antitrust regime that is similar to the one that we
have in the United States. This would be an excellent way to test
whether the calamities that the insurance industry has predicted would
actually come to pass in the United States if we ever deregulated this
industry and subjected it to normal antitrust scrutiny.
I am proposing, in other words, something similar to the suggestion
Professor Waller makes in Section IV of his paper. 6J In this section he
suggests analyzing the experience of other nations in the antidumping
area for ideas on how we might modify our own antidumping regime. 62
I share his lack of love for our dumping laws and his hope that the study
of foreign approaches in this area will give us ideas for ways to cut back
antidumping enforcement in a manner that might be politically saleable.
This is another wonderful example of how the United States could learn
much from a comparative approach to law.
IV. WILL THE HIGHEST COMMON DENOMINATOR RULE?
Professor Waller notes that the recent proliferation of antitrust
regimes could lead to a situation where the highest common
denominator rules. 63 Multinational firms increasingly will have to
conform their practices to dozens of different antitrust regimes and
might, out of risk aversion, simplicity, or inflexibility, conform their
practices to the most stringent laws. 64 Large multinational mergers
could potentially be blocked, in whole or in part, by any of these
enforcers. 65

L. REV. 1449, 1457-59 (1999) (defining and detailing the origin of the "state action" doctrine).
60. See Alan M. Anderson, Insurance and Antitrust Law: The McCarran-Ferguson Act and
Beyond, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 81, 83-90 (1983) (discussing the history of the McCarranFerguson Act and the insurance industry's rationale for requesting an antitrust exception).
61. See Waller, supra note I, at 134-36.

62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See William E. Kovacic, Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in
Transition Economies, 23 BROOK. 1. INT'L L. 403, 404 (1997); Robert H. Lande, Creating
Competition Policy For Transition Economies, 23 BROOK. 1. INT'L. L. 339, 339-40 (1997).
65. See Eleanor M. Fox, Extraterritoriality and Merger Law: Can All Nations Rule the
World?, December 1999 ANTITRUST REPORT at 2.
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Professor Waller concludes that to the extent this occurs, it could be
desirable. 66 Some nations' enforcers would likely challenge an
anticompetitive merger, joint venture, or cartel even if other nations'
enforcement agencies were understaffed, stupid, or corrupt. Whether
this is desirable, however, depends in part upon one's ideology. If you
are a conservative then this possibility of a trend toward the highest
common denominator is highly undesirable. If you regard virtually
every merger or joint venture as benign or desirable, you want as few
regimes that would potentially challenge them as possible. 67 You
would want the opposite of the situation that Waller foresees - a lowest
common denominator approach where the most lenient standard would
control. You might even feel the same way about cartels. If you
believe the enforcers of most countries were likely to be corrupt, even
widespread anti-cartel enforcement would do more harm than good. 68
Antitrust enforcement against cartels would just represent additional
occasions for graft by the enforcers and judges, but would not benefit
the pUblic. 69
By contrast, if you believe that strong antitrust enforcement usually is
desirable, you probably would regard Professor Waller's prediction, to
the extent it occurs, as welcome. Foreign cartels, for example, can
escape antitrust prosecution in a variety of ways, including the act of
state doctrine (OPEC's methodfO or by operating in such a manner that
they do not do business in countries with unfavorable antitrust laws (De

66. See Waller, supra note I, at 134-35.
67. For an example of scholars with very conservative, anti-interventionist views in this area,
see A. E. Rodriguez & Malcolm B. Coate, Competition Policy in Transition Economies: The Role
oj Competition Advocacy, 23 BROOK. 1. INT'L. LAW 365 (1997).
68. See id. at 394-400 (suggesting that much antitrust enforcement is rent-seeking behavior).
69. These enforcement actions would just transfer rents from cartel members to the corrupt
enforcers and judges. These transfers would not benefit the public and could serve to further
erode societal respect for the rule of law.
70. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th CiT. 1981). In OPEC,
the International Association of Machinist and Aerospace Workers argued that OPEC violated
United States antitrust law through fixing the price of oil and petroleum derived products. See id.
at 1355. The court held that the activities of OPEC were immune from suit under the act of state
doctrine. See id. at 1361-62. In defining this doctrine the court stated, "[tJhe act of state doctrine
declares that a United States court will not adjudicate a politically sensitive dispute which would
require the court to judge the legality of the sovereign act of a foreign state." [d. at 1358.
However, the Supreme Court in Kirkpatrick Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. limited the
application of the act of state doctrine. See 493 U.S. 400 (1990). In Kirkpatrick, the Court held
that the act of state doctrine does not apply where a foreign government may merely be
embarrassed about the outcome of litigation. See id. at 409. The Court stated, "[tJhe act of state
doctrine does not establish an exception for cases and controversies that may embarrass foreign
governments, but merely requires that, in the process of deciding, the acts of foreign sovereigns
taken within their own jurisdictions shall be deemed valid." [d.
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Beers does not do business in the United States).7) So, clever cartels
often can act with impunity. This is especially true because large
multinational companies often can be flexible on a nation-by-nation
basis. They can retain local counsel and avoid each nation's antitrust
laws on a country-by-country basis.
I largely agree with Professor Waller's prediction. Since I am
generally in favor of vigorous antitrust enforcement I agree with his
point that much good could arise if the highest common denominator
rules. Conservatives also should agree with his prediction, even if they
do not like its implications.
V.

CONCLUSION

Professor Waller's admonition that the United States should analyze
the experience of other nations in the antitrust area is a sound one. Over
time the United States antitrust community increasingly will come to
regard the individuals and institutions involved in the antitrust efforts of
the European Union and other countries as our equals rather than as our
younger siblings or children. As this happens I hope that we will follow
Professor Waller's advice more than we do currently. For all these
reasons I am delighted that Professor Waller has engaged in this unAmerican approach to antitrust.

71. See Dale J. Montpelier, Comment, Diamonds Are Forever? Implications of United States'
Antitrust Laws on International Trade and the De Beers Diamond Cartel, 24 CAL. W. INT'L. L. J.
277, 299 (1994) (discussing the corporate structure and sales practices of De Beers and the
Department of Justice's attempts to enforce United States antitrust law extraterritorially).

***

